Ithaca Cortland Lawyer "Why You Can't Lie to the Police but the Police can Lie to You"

I get lots of calls from people asking me for my help, and advice pre-arrest. The police have called them or banged on their door, and just want to talk with them.

Question Number One: Should they give or make a statement to the police?

Question Number Two: Should they answer police questions?

Some Typical Scenarios:

The police found something. A backpack, a car part or the car itself, a wallet, or a laptop.

The police got a call. Someone heard something, someone saw something, or someone knows something?

Before you go helping the police, before making admissions, what are you really doing? Are you really helping them to charge YOU with some crime? Are you going to give them evidence? Are you going to implicate (great word) yourself? Are they your friend?

Understanding the ONE WAY STREET

In my quest to explain the intersection of law enforcement and police interrogation I am once again dumbfounded by the amount of misinformation online. The internet is a marvelous thing but with one main caveat, don't believe everything you read. Just because it is posted online don't make it true. Seeking answers to questions from people with no background, training, or experience can be a recipe for disaster.

In my last blog I explained why police are allowed to lie to the public to further their criminal investigations. See Ithaca Lawyer Blog, February 28, 2012. In this blog I want to show and further explain the other side, why you are not permitted to lie to the police. Seems unfair on the surface, this one way street but in truth that is why we have the Miranda Warnings and criminal defense lawyers. They exist to bring balance to the powers that be.

WHY THE POLICE MUST LIE

The lesser of evils is that we as a society want perpetrators to be uncovered, and brought to justice. Law enforcement must use "information gathering techniques" to catch rapists, murderers, robbers, and to remove dangerous people. Life is truly a balancing act, and this is also the case with police behavior. If police were always straight and honest could they get information? Maybe, but at what cost? If we want them (the police) to be quick and effective then we also want them to have an advantage over criminals (those who lie as a profession), and so we allow them this leeway to interrogate using lies. Kinda like the story of the scorpion and the frog, the scorpion (stinging frogs) will always act true to it's nature. Police are in the profession of law enforcement.

WHY YOU MUST NOT LIE TO THE POLICE  


Let's go through some of the crimes with which you will be charged for lying to the police:

1. Giving a false name and DOB = Criminal Impersonation 2nd
2. Giving a False Statement
3. Falsely Reporting a Crime
4. Falsely Reporting an Incident
5. Lying Under Oath = Perjury
6. Obstructing justice

Why can't you lie when they can? 

The one main reason, is that they are doing a job, they are investigating crime, they are enforcing the law and you are impeding that effort by not being truthful. Your lie may cost time and money. Your lie may prevent, block, or impede their investigation. Depending on the context, your lie may allow and facilitate further crimes.

YOUR TRUE PROTECTION FROM POLICE LIES


When you are accused and arrested for a crime "You" have one main protection from the government, and law enforcement interrogation techniques. You must invoke your Miranda Rights.


YOU have a right to remain silent.
YOU have a right to an attorney.
YOU have a right to have an attorney present (with you) during questioning.


Why would you NOT want these? These rights came as the result of decades of injustice.


These are RIGHTS. You have to get them but you must be proactive. You must speak up.


THE FOUR WORDS


Say   "I want a lawyer."

This stops everything. All questioning. All lying. All harassing behavior. 
Have a lawyer present during any questioning. This is your ultimate protection.
This balances out the overwhelming power and authority of the government.


Law Offices of Lawrence Newman
504 N. Aurora Street
Ithaca, NY 14850


607-229-5184


http://www.ithacadwi.com

Pet Custody Cases in Divorce on the Rise Nationwide

http://www.timesunion.com/living/article/Divorce-lawyers-Pet-custody-cases-increasing-3367467.php

Ithaca Cortland Lawyer Why are the Police Allowed to Lie?

from uptownmagazine.com

It may come as no surprise to people that police sometimes lie. When I tell people that law enforcement are "permitted" to do that then they are taken aback. Permitted by whom or what? What do I mean?

This lying, It's NOT in the United States Constitution, nor in the New York State regulations.

THE "ROLE" OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Actually it is (an unspoken) part of their job duties or description. Their role after all is to investigate crimes, to arrest, and to charge (enforce) crimes under the law. Remember the Steven Seagal movie "Above the Law," well you are considered "Below the Law."

In the performance or context of their duties they interrogate people. In order to interrogate (question) them fully, and successfully they will tell lies. They want people to tell them the truth. They seek admissions of guilt. They seek fault and blame. They want people to basically open up. Can they get a confession?

In order to get what they want in this quest for justice they are permitted to tell people just about anything. They may tell them misstatements of law, factual impossibilities or improbabilities, and even things that never occurred. It might sound strange that to get at the truth we allow the government enforcers to lie. Kinda follows the logic of "the ends justify the means."

THE INVOCATION

To balance out this (police intrusion) conduct you have CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
BUT YOU must invoke your rights. They will not surface until you state the magic words to the police, "I want a lawyer." Your two main rights of protection against the police (the government) are under Miranda:

1. The right to remain silent. Silence in this context is golden.
2. The right to have counsel present during questions. This balances the playing field, nothing more or less.

These rights came about after decades of police abuses in investigating crimes, and forcing confessions.
They used to Question people for hours and hours under hot lights, deprived of sleep, and without food or drink. This was the norm back in the day. Today the military has shown us the uses and abuses of water boarding, humiliation tactics, and psychological degradation to prisoners.

You stand nothing to gain and much to lose by talking with the police without an attorney present. The power and psychological advantage alone creates a dangerous situation for most people (guilty and innocent).

Lawrence Newman, D.C., Esq.
504 N. Aurora St.
Ithaca, NY 14850
607-229-5184

http://www.ithacadwi.com

Four Former NYPD Officers Plead Guilty

Four Former NYPD Officers Plead Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Participating in Conspiracies to Transport Firearms and/or Stolen Goods 
Nine of the Twelve Defendants Originally Charged Have Now Plead Guilty

U.S. Attorney’s OfficeFebruary 27, 2012

Southern District of New York(212) 637-2600

LINK

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that former New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers GARY ORTIZ, JOSEPH TRISCHITTA, JOHN MAHONEY, and RICHARD MELNIK pled guilty to engaging in conspiracies to transport firearms and/or stolen goods across state lines. Associates MICHAEL GEE and ERIC GOMER also pled guilty to participating in a scheme to transport stolen goods interstate, and GEE pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy to sell a firearm to an out-of-state resident. ORTIZ, TRISCHITTA, MAHONEY, and GEE each pled guilty today, and MELNIK and GOMER pled guilty last week.

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said: “As they admitted today, these police officers moonlighted as criminals, and even planned to use their badges to cover their illegal activity. When officers break the law they swear to uphold, they undermine the public’s confidence, and the damage they cause cannot be overstated. To date, seven law enforcement officers have admitted to violating this sacred trust, and now they must face the consequences of their betrayal.”

According to the Complaint, the plea agreements, the Informations to which each defendant pled, and statements made in court:

From September 2010 to October 2011, ORTIZ and TRISCHITTA participated in a scheme to transport firearms across state lines. ORTIZ, TRISCHITTA, and their co-conspirators helped transport three M-16 rifles, one shotgun, and 16 handguns – the majority of which had been defaced to remove or alter the serial number – from New Jersey to New York. In another scheme, ORTIZ and TRISCHITTA, joined by MAHONEY, MELNIK, GEE, and GOMER, and other co-conspirators, helped transport what they believed were stolen goods, including slot machines and thousands of cartons of cigarettes, as well as various counterfeit merchandise, across state lines. In total, the goods they illegally transported carried a street value of approximately $1 million. GEE also participated in a conspiracy to sell a firearm to an out-ofstate resident.

While participating in the scheme, ORTIZ and MAHONEY were active-duty officers, in Brooklyn’s 71st and 68th precincts, respectively. For part of the time, TRISCHITTA was an active-duty officer in Brooklyn’s 68th precinct. MELNIK was a retired NYPD Officer who had previously worked in Brooklyn’s 68th precinct. The ringleader was William Masso, who was an active-duty officer in Brooklyn’s 68th precinct.

In preparing for, and carrying out this scheme, the defendants specifically discussed using their credentials and knowledge as law enforcement officers. In a meeting on March 24, 2011, Masso told MAHONEY, MELNIK, and TRISCHITTA that they should carry their law enforcement badges during the operation and, if stopped, should say they were police officers working off-duty to deliver items another person had purchased at an auction. At that same meeting, TRISCHITTA discussed a potential problem using a certain brand of rental truck to transport the merchandise since law enforcement is trained to look for that type of truck in connection with potential criminal activity. The following day, after transporting six slot machines they believed to have been stolen from New Jersey to New York, MELNIK said that they needed to coordinate better on future meetings to make sure they were not all in the same parking lot, which made it look like they were scoping out the area.

During their guilty pleas, ORTIZ and TRISCHITTA admitted that they had willfully transported firearms across state lines, in violation of their obligations as NYPD Officers. They, along with MAHONEY, MELNIK, GEE, and GOMER, also admitted that they had knowingly transported what they believed were stolen cigarettes, slot machines, and/or other merchandise across state lines.

* * *

ORTIZ, 28, of Brooklyn, New York, pled guilty today before U.S. Magistrate Judge Theodore H. Katz to one count of conspiracy to transport firearms interstate and one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. ORTIZ agreed to a money judgment of $18,000, representing the amount of the crime proceeds, and agreed to forfeit his interest in one gun seized from him at the time of his arrest. He is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Paul G. Gardephe on June 12, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. TRISCHITTA, 42, of Staten Island, New York pled guilty today before Judge Katz to one count of conspiracy to transport firearms interstate and one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

TRISCHITTA agreed to a money judgment of $11,500, representing the amount of the crime proceeds, and agreed to forfeit his interest in five guns seized from him at the time of his arrest. He is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley on July 6, 2012 at 2:00 p.m.

MAHONEY, 27, of Staten Island, New York, pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge Richard J. Sullivan to one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. MAHONEY agreed to a money judgment of $4,500, representing the amount of the crime proceeds, and agreed to forfeit his interest in two guns seized from him at the time of his arrest. He is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Sullivan on June 15, 2012 at 11:30 a.m.

GEE, 50, of Staten Island, New York, pled guilty today before Judge Katz to one count of conspiracy to sell a firearm to an out-of-state resident and one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. GEE agreed to a money judgment of $5,000, representing the amount of the crime proceeds. He is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. on June 1, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.

MELNIK, 43, of Staten Island, New York, pled guilty on February 24, 2012 before U.S. Magistrate Judge Frank Maas to one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. MELNIK agreed to a money judgment of $5,000, representing the amount of the crime proceeds, and agreed to forfeit his interest in three guns seized from him at the time of his arrest. He is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Barbara S. Jones on July 6, 2012 at 2:30 p.m.

GOMER, 28, of Rhode Island, New York, pled guilty on February 22, 2012 before U.S. District Judge John F. Keenan to one count of conspiracy to transport and receive stolen merchandise. He faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. GOMER agreed to a money judgment of $5,000, representing the amount of the crime proceeds, and agreed to forfeit his interest in a replica gun seized from him at the time of his arrest. He is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Keenan on May 30, 2012 at 3:00 p.m.

Three defendants previously pled guilty in connection with the case. Masso pled guilty on February 6, 2012 and is scheduled to be sentenced on June 15, 2012. Marco Venezia, a former NYPD Officer, and David Kanwisher, a corrections officer in New Jersey, each pled guilty on February 15, 2012 and are scheduled to be sentenced on June 21, 2012 and May 25, 2012, respectively.

Charges are pending against former NYPD Officers Eddie Goris and Ali Oklu and former NYC Department of Sanitation Police Officer Anthony Santiago. Goris is scheduled to appear in Magistrate Court on March 1, 2012 at 2:30 p.m. for a plea hearing. Santiago is scheduled appear before U.S. District Judge Deborah A. Batts on March 9, 2012 at 2:30 p.m. for a plea hearing. Oklu is scheduled to appear at a pretrial conference before Judge Pauley on March 23, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. The charges against these co-conspirators are merely accusations, and these defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Mr. Bharara praised the investigative work of the FBI and the Internal Affairs Bureau of the NYPD.

This prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption and Complex Frauds units. Assistant United States Attorneys Carrie H. Cohen, Brent S. Wible, and Amanda Kramer are in charge of the cases.

12-062

###

Important New Decisions - February 26, 2012

Supreme Court Holds Once a Party Has Stated under Oath That the Marriage Has Been Irretrievably Broken for a Period of at Least Six Months, the Cause of Action for Divorce Has Been Established as a Matter of Law and There Is No Defense

In Townes v Coker, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 444054 (N.Y.Sup.) the parties were married on June 12, 1981 and had three emancipated children. On October 6, 2008, Wife commenced an action for divorce against Husband. In her verified reply the Wife consented to the entry of the Judgement of Divorce based on Husband's counterclaim for constructive abandonment. On March 23, 2009, the parties executed a Stipulation, "So-Ordered" by Hon. Anthony J. Falanga, wherein Wife agreed to discontinue the 2008 action so that Husband may commence his own action on the grounds of constructive abandonment. Pursuant to the terms of the March 23, 2009 Stipulation, on or about April 8, 2009, the Husband commenced an action for divorce based upon the grounds of constructive abandonment. (Action No. 1). The Wife served a Verified Answer consenting to a divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment. On or about March 21, 2011 the Husband made a motion seeking to discontinue Action No. 1. The Court denied Husband's motion. On or about February 15, 2011 the Wife commenced Action No. 2 and moved to consolidate Action No. 1 and Action No. 2 pursuant to CPLR 602 which the Court granted. The wife then moved Summary Judgment with respect to her cause of action alleged in Action No. 2, based upon the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage between the parties for at least six (6) months. The Wife's cause of action in Action No 2 was predicated upon the "no-fault" ground for divorce established in DRL 170(7), the irretrievable breakdown of the relationship of the parties. The Wife's Verified Complaint (Action No. 2) stated in relevant part: 11. The grounds for divorce are as follows: Irretrievable Breakdown of the Relationship (DRL Sec. 170(7)): The relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant has been broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six (6) months. In opposition to Wife's application for summary judgment as to grounds, the Husband categorically denied his Wife's claims that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature did not enact a defense to this cause of action and courts cannot employ statutory construction to enact an intent that the Legislature did not express. Thus, neither the Husband, nor the Court, may create a defense where it is clear that the Legislature intentionally declined to do so. See, Pajak v. Pajak, 56 N.Y.2d 394, 452 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1982). Since the Wife stated "under oath" that the marriage is irretrievably broken, there was no basis for directing a trial with regard to this action of action for divorce. DRL 170(7) states that a divorce may be granted where: (7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. Thus, once a party has stated under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for a period of at least six months, the cause of action for divorce has been established as a matter of law. The Court declined to follow the holding in Strack v.. Strack, 31 Misc.3d 258, 916 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup.Ct., Essex Cty., 2011), which held that a husband has the right to a trial on the "no fault" ground asserted by Wife. Also, see Schiffer v. Schiffer, 33 Misc.3d 795 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Co., 2011). Supreme Court held that pursuant to DRL §170(7), once either party states under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for at least six months, the grounds are no longer at issue and there is no right to a trial, by jury or otherwise. The entire purpose of the statute was to permit the Court to grant a divorce without requiring a trial. It noted that in AC v. DR, 32 Misc.3d 293, 305, 927 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup.Ct. Nassau Co., 2011), Justice Falanga stated the plaintiff's self-serving declaration about his or her state of mind is all that is required for the dissolution of a marriage on grounds that it is irretrievably broken. In the court's view, the Legislature did not intend nor is there a defense to DRL 170(7). Notwithstanding the foregoing and assuming arguendo, that the Husband was entitled to a defense regarding DRL 170(7), here the Husband's general denial of Wife's allegations that the marriage was broken down irretrievably was belied by his sworn statement in his Verified Complaint (Action No. 1) in which he stated: Continuing for a period of more than one (1) year immediately prior to the commencement of this action, defendant has continuously refused to have sexual relations with the plaintiff despite plaintiff's repeated requests to resume such relations. Based upon the Husband's sworn admission that his Wife has refused to have sexual relations with him for at least one (1) year despite his repeated request for same, it was difficult for this Court to imagine a better example of a irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship where one spouse continually refuses to have sexual relations with the other spouse for a period of at least one year. Here, the Husband was bound by his own sworn admission contained in his Verified Complaint, thereby eliminating any triable issues of fact for the Court to determine.



UCCJEA Requires Court to Communicate with Sister State Court Where Custody Actions Commenced in Two States

In Guzman v Guzman, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 401081 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) in November 2009, the mother commenced a proceeding, seeking to modify thecustody and visitation provisions of a 2008 Florida judgment of divorce, entered upon the parties' stipulation, which awarded the father primary residential custody of the child. Before any determination could be made in this proceeding, the father relocated with the child to Florida. Thereafter, on December 22, 2009, the Family Court issued a determination, in effect, dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and it advised the mother to seek relief in Florida. However, when the mother subsequently commenced a custody proceeding with respect to the child in Florida, the Florida court determined that Florida was an inconvenient forum and that New York was the more appropriate forum, and it stayed the custody proceeding commenced in the Florida court. The mother then moved in the Family Court, Queens County, to vacate the Family Court's determination dated December 22, 2009. Without consulting with the Florida court, the Family Court denied the motion in an order dated March 2, 2011. The Appellate Division held that under the circumstances of this case, the order dated March 2, 2011, had to be reversed, that branch of the mother's motion to vacate the determination dated December 22, 2009, granted, the petition reinstated, and the matter remitted to the Family Court, for further proceedings. At the time the mother commenced this modification proceeding in November 2009 the Family Court, Queens County, had jurisdiction over it pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §76-b, based on the fact that the parties and the child lived in New York, and none of them had resided in Florida for over a year. The child was enrolled in school in New York, her sister had resided in New York with the mother since 2007, the father had commenced a proceeding in New York to modify the custody provisions of the Florida judgment of divorce with respect to the sister, and the Family Court, Queens County, had obtained a forensic study of the parties for use in that proceeding. Therefore, the parties and the subject child had significant connections with this State, and it appeared that "substantial evidence [was] available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76[1][b][ii] ). Accordingly, New York had jurisdiction to modify the custody and visitation provisions of the parties' Florida judgment of divorce with respect to the subject child. Nonetheless, where custody proceedings relating to a child are pending in different states-in this case, New York and Florida-Domestic Relations Law § 76-e applies, and the courts of the two states must confer with each other. Since the Family Court made its initial determination, in effect, dismissing the petition in this proceeding, the father and the child apparently had resided in Florida. In view of these circumstances, upon remittal, the Family Court, Queens County, was directed to contact the Florida court so that the courts of the two states may confer with each other and determine which state was the more appropriate forum for the proceeding at this juncture.

　

Peru Fails to Stop Spain in Odyssey Marine Case

Outside the US Supreme Court

The case of Republic of Peru v. Kingdom of Spain et al. (11A795)--related to Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Kingdom of Spain, et al.--saw a last minute emergency appeal quashed Thursday. Peru made the final effort to stop coins, believed to be from the galleon called Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes, from returning to Spain. Spain has insisted that the so-called Black Swan treasure was taken unlawfully by salvor Odyssey Marine because the company impermissibly removed the items from a ship flying the Spanish flag.

US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas denied Peru’s appeal on February 23, just two days after that country filed its application to stay. Peru made claims in federal court that the coins were minted in that country.  Justice Thomas also denied Odyssey Marine's application for a stay on February 9.

The high court's decision clears the way for the 17 ton load of coins to be transferred to Spain.  Odyssey Marine's stock fell nearly 4% on Friday.

CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Retired Judge, Joins Law Firm Handling A Case Previously Before Him

Firm Disqualified After Hiring Ex-Judge Who Had Heard Client's Case

Andrew Keshner

New York Law Journal

02-24-2012

LINK

A Brooklyn appellate court has disqualified a Long Island law firm from handling a woman's divorce after the judge presiding over the case retired and joined the firm.

In Manditch v. Manditch, 2011-04091, a unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected arguments that the former judge had been effectively insulated from the case. It held in a brief, unsigned Feb. 7 decision that a lower court judge had "improvidently exercised its discretion" by declining the husband's motion to disqualify his wife's firm.

Now-retired Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Donald R. Blydenburgh had been presiding over the divorce action between Douglas C. Manditch and his wife, Devon, since its 2007 inception when he filed his retirement papers on Aug. 27, 2010, effective Sept. 30.

Following a Sept. 19, 2010, report in Newsday of the judge's imminent retirement from the bench, Ms. Manditch's attorney, Philip Castrovinci of Castrovinci & Mady in Smithtown, said in court papers that he approached the judge on Sept. 21 about a job.

On Oct. 1, 2010, the judge became a non-equity partner in what became known as Castrovinci, Blydenburgh & Mady.

Attorneys for the husband— the chairman and CEO of Empire National Bank in the still-pending divorce action—unsuccessfully moved for disqualification of the firm before Acting Suffolk County Justice James F. Quinn (See Profile).

On appeal, Mr. Manditch argued in his brief that the "integrity of the judicial process has been eviscerated" by Justice Quinn's refusal to disqualify the firm, later saying "the taint of impropriety is simply overwhelming."

Mr. Manditch added that the Castrovinci firm had not followed requirements to notify its opponents and the court of its intentions to stay on the case after Mr. Blydenburgh joined the firm.

Specifically, Mr. Manditch cited Rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that when firms become affiliated with someone who has acted "in a judicial capacity" on a matter, the firm cannot "undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless…the firm acts promptly and reasonably to…give written notice to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule."

Mr. Manditch said purported safeguards to ensure the former judge did not become involved in the case were "at best, vague and at worst, illusory."

But the Castrovinci firm stressed in its own court papers that Mr. Blydenburgh was "totally insulated" from the case, having been excluded from all conversations, never meeting Ms. Manditch and earning a salary instead of fees generated by this case or other cases where he acted as a judge.

See Mr. Manditch's reply brief.

Noting Mr. Manditch's large income, the Castrovinci firm called the appeal "simply another weapon in [Mr. Manditch's] arsenal, calculated to financially exhaust [Ms. Manditch] until she has no choice but to capitulate."

The Castrovinci firm responded in its brief to the issue of notice by arguing there was no case law to buttress the proposition that "such a formality was lauded over substance."

Disqualification of the firm was "punitive, harsh, unnecessary and highly prejudicial," the Castrovinci firm argued. It claimed that with Ms. Manditch's "limited financial means," she could not find new representation, amounting to a "death knell" for her case.

But the panel was not swayed, writing that "under the facts of this case, including that the law firm representing the defendant did not comply with the notice requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rule 1.12(d), the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion."

The couple was married in June 2003, the third marriage for Mr. Manditch and the second for Ms. Manditch.

While presiding over the case, Mr. Blydenburgh in April 2010 granted partial summary judgment to Mr. Manditch, ruling that, under a pre-nuptial agreement, it was the intent of the parties that all past, present and future retirement and stock option benefits were separate property.

Following a request for clarification from Ms. Manditch, the judge issued a June 2010 amended order, that according to Mr. Manditch "effectively reversed" the earlier decision. On Sept. 3, 2010, the judge refused to vacate his June 2010 amended order.

Mr. Manditch appealed the refusal to vacate the order. The Second Department affirmed Judge Blydenburgh in a November 2011 ruling.

In the current case, Mr. Manditch argued, "It strains credulity to believe that after the retirement papers were filed on August 27, 2010, the former Judge and Mr. Castrovinci were not discussing, negotiating and planning for him to join the firm" while the judge was writing the Sept. 3 order.

The Castrovinci firm said the September decision only reiterated the June decision—made about four months before Mr. Blydenburgh joined the firm.

Mr. Blydenburgh is no longer with the firm, which is now named Castrovinci & Mady, according to a receptionist at the firm.

Mr. Blydenburgh, 60, served as a Suffolk County Supreme Court justice from January 1997 until his Sept. 2010 retirement. He could not be reached for comment.

Glenn S. Koopersmith of Garden City represented Mr. Manditch on appeal. He said his client was "uncomfortable" with the firm's attempts to stay on the case after hiring the judge.

"Notwithstanding their representation they were not involving him in the representation, that did not make my client feel comfortable, he felt the appearance of impropriety was overwhelming," Mr. Koopersmith said.

Justices Peter B. Skelos (See Profile), Ruth C. Balkin (See Profile), Sheri S. Roman (See Profile) and Sandra L. Sgroi (See Profile) joined the decision.

The case was argued on Jan. 17, though the Castrovinci firm did not appear for oral argument, Mr. Koopersmith said.

Mr. Castrovinci did not respond to a request for comment. Ruth Sovronsky of the Castrovinci firm appeared on the brief.

@|Andrew Keshner can be contacted at akeshner@alm.com.

Judge Kevin Cronin Jails Disabled Mother

Judge Cronin

 ParentingNewsNetwork

LINK

Judge Kevin Cronin of Allegan County, Michigan, sentenced disabled protective mother Maria Melinn to jail for 21 days in response to non-payment of child support. Her disability is reported to be from a broken back allegedly inflicted on her by her ex-husband.

In 2008, Kevin Cronin campaigned against the prior incumbent judge based on a “Family Values” platform. He was endorsed by the religious right American Family Association, the Family Rights Coalition – PAC, and several Father’s Rights groups. His campaign smeared his opponent for being liberal and associated with homosexuals.

In 2009, Dads Of Michigan.org honored Judge Kevin Cronin ”For efforts in maximizing child access to both parents and his work to support both parents involvement in children’s lives.”

Cronin does seem to be concerned with Father’s Rights, but not a child’s right to be with their mother. Compare this disabled mother’s sentence to a father’s sentence Cronin gave to a man whose son was stabbed.

Cronin sentenced the 34-year-old to 90 days in jail, 2 years probation and more than $2,400 in fines and costs for being an accessory after the fact to a felony…

Cronin was struggling with the sentencing, saying he wanted to hand down a substantial punishment for Joseph Embree’s lack of judgment, but realized the three children need to have their father with them.
Harsher punishment would have meant unemployment and loss of the home, Cronin said. “It would destroy your relationship with the children.”

Cronin projects an image of piety, but he really seems to be a man who hates women, at least unmarried women who are mothers. This misogynistic judge does not reflect family values, but patriarchal Father’s Rights.  (Unless “Family Values” is code for patriarchy) This judge is making the United States family court system look like the Judeo-Christian version of Sharia law