Thứ Hai, 31 tháng 12, 2012

NYS Senate Democrats Choose Sen. Andrea Stewart-Cousins Instead of John Sampson

Kevin Parker Hands John Sampson His Second Loss of the Week

Written by Aaron Short on . Posted in Blog, Features, Heard Around Town, Latest.



State Sen. Kevin Parker

State Sen. John Sampson has had a rough week. Senate Democrats chose state Sen. Andrea Stewart-Cousins instead of Sampson as their minority leader in a surprising 19-6 vote on Monday.
The next day state Sen. Kevin Parker trounced him in the 2012 Stars of New York Dance contest at Long Island University’s Kumble Theater in Brooklyn.
Sampson reportedly spent several hours practicing his choreography but looked a step slow and was no match for Parker, who unleashed a torrent of old school hip-hop steps to Doug E. Fresh, LL Cool J, and Salt ‘n’ Pepa songs that brought the crowd to its feet and Sampson to his knees.
Parker was gracious in victory. “It always feels good to win,” he said. “We found a way to turn this ugly duckling into a swan.”
Parker said he did not cast a vote in the leadership race because he couldn’t make the meeting but said Stewart-Cousins matches the ideological goals of the conference. “I’m sure the senator is disappointed, everyone likes to win, but if it is going to be somebody else, Andrea is a great choice,” he said.
Sampson left the theater after the judges declared Parker the winner and could not be reached for comment.
Check out Sampson’s dance moves here, http://bit.ly/TyG57n, and Parker’s hip hop stylings here, http://bit.ly/UDvx6c.
UPDATE ON THE VOTE: The internal vote was 19-6. 25 people voted, but Parker did not cast a ballot.

Ithaca Attorney The Anatomy of a New York OASAS DWI Drug/Alcohol Evaluation




from johnbarban.com

In 2006 the New York State legislature mandated that all DWI related drug/alcohol evaluations (aka assessments) be done by OASAS certified providers. OASAS = Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services. They are the state agency that overlooks the delivery of alcohol and substance abuse services (assessments/treatments) in New York. NOTE: Throughout this blog post I will interchange the terms assessment and evaluation, for all intents and purposes they are the same.

New Times Call for New Protocols

The majority of NYS DWI defendants will have to be assessed at some point in their case, this can occur either before, during, or after the criminal case is resolved. It used to be that only those with a .15 BAC at time of arrest were legally obligated to get one BUT many Courts (Judges) and Prosecutors will not finalize (sentence) a case without seeing one or will condition any sentencing upon the providing of one by a certain date. Many Judges will also condition their sentencing upon the completion (with proof) any and all recommended treatment based upon this evaluation.

Assessments are important to the disposition of your case because they can influence the view of the District Attorney, the sentencing by the Judge, the license re-instatement by the DMV, and any future investigation of an employer, certifying or licensing body, or anyone placing you in a position of responsibility.

This post will address exactly what happens at an OASAS evaluation?  What are the specific criteria used by the evaluator to make an OASAS assessment?

The Basic Overview A, B, and C

A. The evaluation is an INTERVIEW. It is INTERACTIVE. It will require your participation and engagement. If you come off as standoffish, or guarded, this may be viewed as either lying or avoidance. Either position may be interpreted as covering up (lying about) a problem (issue) with drugs and/or alcohol.

B. There is NO specific alcohol assessment versus drug assessment. Alcohol is a drug. The evaluation wants to know about all your use of any and all substances over the course of your lifetime.

C. The Evaluation is an integration of many mini assessments of everything, spanning and encompassing just about every area of your life.

Evaluators are psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and nurse practitioners who have submitted documented proof to OASAS that they have the necessary experience (training, education, certification) in the specific area of addiction. That is why the approach taken (by these providers) in the giving of assessments may be different and diverse. The goals are the same.

The Anatomy of an Evaluation (Seven Parts) 

I. The evaluator will take a Comprehensive Psychosocial History.

The key word here is HISTORY. This is truly a thorough History of everything you have ever ingested, done, completed, obtained, and/or messed up.

This will involve many of the following areas:

1. History of Use of All substances (Marijuana, Opioids, Sedatives, Nicotine, Alcohol, etc.) used over the course of your lifetime. The frequency, amount, and the time periods of use. History of Any and all related treatment for any of these these. History of recovery and/or abstinence from use.

2. History of YOUR Physical Health. Providers, exams, finding, diagnoses, medications, etc.

3. History of YOUR Mental Health. Past mental health treatment and assessments.
Examination (mini) of your mental health: Orientation, Intellectual/mental ability, Mood history (depressed, anxious, angry, sad, etc.), Lethality assessment (do you have a death wish?), Planning to kill yourself or anyone else?

4. Vocational/Educational/Employment Assessment. Measure of your Literacy, Education, and Employment.

5. Social/Leisure Assessment. ADLs (activities of daily living): Can you care for yourself? Can you provide for your own needs? Social/Leisure activities: What do you do for fun? Does an of it involve drugs?

6. Family Assessment. Issues growing up? Issues currently? Relationships with family members? How well did you do as a child, parent, brother, sister, spouse, etc.?

7. Legal Assessment. Any interactions with legal issues?

8. Gambling Assessment. Any issues with gambling?

9. Military Service.

10. Spirituality/Religion. Involvement in any organized religious groups/activities. Religious Beliefs.

II. Giving YOU either the MAST (Michigan Alcohol Screening Test) or the RIASI (Research Institute on Addictions Self Inventory). They are tests that yield behavioral clues or concerns.

III. Collateral Source Assessments: 

Interviews with family, friends, and/or co-workers to confirm and/or challenge anything you have said (stated/answered) during the evaluation. NOTE: This is soon to become one of the important assessment criteria. How others see you and your behavior will be given greater weight in making a final diagnosis than your view (statements about) of your behavior.

IV. Drug/Alcohol Screening (Urinalysis)

V. Review of the YOUR UTTs (charging documents), Police Report, and Arrest Paperwork 

The Nature of this DWI arrest and circumstances, ie. accident, injuries, multiple drugs, BAC level

VI. Review of YOUR DMV Driving Abstract (10 year history)

Any prior DWs (DUI) in any state, at any prior time?

VII. Signed Consent 

Allows findings, recommendations, and conclusions to be inputted to the DMV Impaired Driver System (IDS) to prevent "doctor shopping." 

2013 Holds New Issues and New Concerns

The evaluator will then use the DSM-IV to make a definitive diagnosis (diagnoses). That was 2012, in 2013 they will use the DSM-V and all prior criteria and prior abuse/dependency verbiage will change. I have written about this in prior blog posts and will continue to expand on this (the changes) as the guidelines are placed into use. Having a new book come out is one thing, but how it is going to applied (practically) is another.

Eliminating or DE-creasing FEAR

It has been said that F.E.A.R. = False Evidence Appearing Real, knowing the truth (the reality behind the eval) can truly be liberating (freeing). The TRUTH can set you FREE.

Understanding what lies ahead helps to bring down worry, concern, and the fear of the unknowns in many DWI and drug related cases. I like to say, "having more certainty is the cure for alleviating fear." Being prepared for everything that lies before you can also help give you confidence to face the process. Better results in the long term usually come along with this increased understanding and confidence.


Dr. Lawrence A. Newman
Doctor of Chiropractic
Attorney and Counselor at Law

504 North Aurora Street
Ithaca, NY 14850

607-229-5184
newman.lawrence@gmail.com

http://www.ithacadwi.com


Chủ Nhật, 30 tháng 12, 2012

Ithaca Cortland Attorney: How to Handle a New York Ignition Interlock Violation


from memegenerator.net


My Realistic Practice GOAL

I have a goal for every legal seminar or conference I go to, and every DWI book or DVD I buy. I want to walk away with at least one good idea.

I try to keep my expectations low, I'm not looking for 50 great ideas, just one and sometimes that one thing may mean the difference to someone I represent. I recently went to two New York DWI conferences in NYC (actually one was held in Brooklyn, but close enough) and got some great DWI defense ideas.

One of the speakers was discussing what to do when clients violate their ignition interlock device. Before I give you what I learned we need a little background and context.

BAC = blood alcohol concentration
IID = Ignition Interlock Device

BAC IID Violation Levels

People can have a series of small (less serious) but frequent violations or just one big (serious) violation. I have had clients blow .03 BAC to a .11 BAC first thing in the morning. The determination (definition) of seriousness (the line so to speak) is a BAC of .05 or higher. Remember in NYS: impairment is assumed at a .06 BAC, and intoxication at .08 BAC.

What is the Most Common Reason for a IID Violation?

The most common violation occurs after a night of drinking and a morning breath test. This is a very bad combo because it takes time to absorb alcohol and it takes time to eliminate alcohol from your body. Normally or generally most people can eliminate about a drink an hour, or .02 per hour. Now this rate can vary of course. It varies based upon your genetics, state of health, food eaten, types of drinks consumed, etc. Bottom LINE: If you don't give your system (your body) enough time to process ALL of your consumed alcohol, your blood and breath are going to demonstrate (and reveal) alcohol.

Will the County IID Monitor Violate You?

It depends upon the reason for the violation. First, is it because the device is malfunctioning or needs calibration? Or is it because your BAC (blood alcohol concentration) was truly high?

When they violate YOU, can they prove it was really YOU? 

If you have a level one device in your car then maybe someone else blew into the device and not YOU.
Level one devices do not have cameras. Level 3 devices have cameras.

If you violated, then the Judge and the ADA (Assistant District Attorney) may re-open sentencing on your DWI case. They could place you in jail for up to a year, place on probation for three years, they could have you re-evaluated, they could extend the time that the device is on your car, extend the time of your CD (conditional discharge) or any combination of these.

My grand advice, and what I learned at my DWI seminar is to:
have your attorney discuss your violation with the County Monitor. 

1. The County Monitor (usually the Probation Department) CAN Make a recommendation in your case. This will be looked upon by the Judge and by the ADA. In fact, in many situations the ADAs give the Probation Department's recommendations great weight.

2. The Probation Department usually seeks to be fair and appropriate in these situations. In New York State they have many Probation Policies, one of which is GRADUATED SANCTIONS. I call them ratcheted sanctions, going up in small increments based upon the scale and severity of the infraction.

This may help limit your exposure to punishments beyond what would be appropriate based upon your prior dealing and plea negotiations with this Judge and/or Prosecutor. Sometimes one good idea may be the only thing that stands between YOU and jail.

Law Offices of Lawrence Newman
607-229-5184
Ithaca, New York

http://www.ithacadwi.com

 

Thứ Bảy, 29 tháng 12, 2012

Important New Decisions - December 29, 2012


Second Department Affirms Holding Setting Aside Post Nuptial Which Was Manifestly Unfair.

In Petracca v. Petracca, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 6030894 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), the parties were married on December 16, 1995. In March 1996, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement. The agreement provided that the jointly-owned marital residence, which had been purchased for approximately $3.1 million after the parties were married, and which was subsequently renovated at a cost of between $3 million and $5 million, was the defendant's separate property. It further provided that if the parties divorced, the plaintiff, who had not been employed other than as a homemaker since October 1995, would waive her interest in any business in which the defendant had an interest, including any appreciation in the value of such interests accruing during the marriage. At the time the agreement was entered into, the defendant valued his interests in these business entities at over $10 million. The plaintiff also waived any and all rights she had to the defendant's estate, including her right to an elective share. At the time the agreement was entered into, the defendant valued his net worth at more than $22 million. Finally, the agreement provided that if the parties divorced, the plaintiff would waive any right to maintenance except as provided in schedule "C" of the agreement, which indicated that the plaintiff could receive maintenance of between $24,000 and $36,000 per year, for varying lengths of time, depending on the duration of the marriage. The defendant's obligation to pay the limited maintenance enumerated in the agreement was contingent upon his receipt of certain visitation with any children that the parties might have, and upon certain residency requirements imposed upon the plaintiff.

In 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce. In his answer, the defendant sought enforcement of the postnuptial agreement. A hearing was held at which both parties testified. The plaintiff testified that the defendant had presented the postnuptial agreement to her for signature days after her 42nd birthday, and shortly after she had suffered a miscarriage. She testified that the defendant had "bullied" her into signing the agreement by threatening that they would not have any children and that the marriage would be over if she did not consent to the postnuptial agreement. The plaintiff testified that she and the defendant had agreed to have children prior to the marriage, and that their agreement to have children had been an important factor in her decision to marry him. She signed the agreement within days of receiving it and, although she reviewed some portions of it, she did not understand its terms and did not consult an attorney. The plaintiff also adduced evidence demonstrating that the statement of the defendant's net worth contained in the agreement was inaccurate at the time it was made in that it was undervalued by at least $11 million.  When the defendant testified, he denied any knowledge of the plaintiff's miscarriage and stated that he had wanted the postnuptial agreement in order to protect his son from a prior marriage. The defendant testified that the parties had discussed the issue of entering into a postnuptial agreement prior to the marriage and that they had negotiated the postnuptial agreement over the course of many weeks. The defendant testified that his attorney had drafted the agreement and that he believed that the plaintiff had consulted with her own attorney, although she had not disclosed her attorney's name to him. The defendant explained that the marital residence had been purchased in both parties' names because the plaintiff said she wanted to have her name on it "for perception purposes, for other people," but that she had been willing to sign the agreement converting it into the defendant's separate property shortly after its purchase. In a decision made after the hearing, the Supreme Court expressed doubts as to the defendant's veracity and credited the plaintiff's testimony over conflicting portions of the defendant's testimony. The court found that the plaintiff had not been represented by counsel and had been precluded from effectively analyzing the financial impact of the postnuptial agreement due to the inaccuracies contained in the financial disclosures that had been incorporated into the agreement. The court determined that the terms of the agreement were "wholly unfair" and, after examining the totality of the circumstances, concluded that it was unenforceable. In a subsequent order, made upon the decision, the court granted the plaintiff's cross motion to set aside the postnuptial agreement.

The Appellate Division affirmed. It observed that in general, a postnuptial agreement which is regular on its face will be recognized and enforced by the courts in much the same manner as an ordinary contract. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, postnuptial agreements "are closely scrutinized by the courts, and such agreements are more readily set aside in equity under circumstances that would be insufficient to nullify an ordinary contract. To warrant equity's intervention, no actual fraud need be shown, for relief will be granted if the [agreement] is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching" ( Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d at 72-73). In determining whether a postnuptial agreement is invalid, "courts may look at the terms of the agreement to see if there is an inference, or even a negative inference, of overreaching in its execution. A spouse seeking to set aside a postnuptial agreement initially bears the burden to establish a fact-based, particularized inequality. Where this initial burden is satisfied, a proponent of a postnuptial agreement "suffers the shift in burden to disprove fraud or overreaching. Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that the terms of the postnuptial agreement were manifestly unfair given the nature and magnitude of the rights she waived, particularly the relinquishment of her property rights in the marital residence and her waiver of all of her inheritance rights, in light of the vast disparity in the parties' net worth and earnings. Inasmuch as the terms of the agreement were manifestly unfair to the plaintiff and were unfair when the agreement was executed, they give rise to an inference of overreaching. This inference of overreaching was bolstered by the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, including her testimony, regarding the circumstances which led her to give her assent to the postnuptial agreement. The defendant's testimony which tended to show that he did not engage in overreaching raised an issue of credibility, and it declined to disturb the Supreme Court's determination with respect thereto.

Court of Appeals Holds that  The Predicate for Admission of Tape Recordings in Evidence Is Clear and Convincing Proof That the Tapes Are Genuine and That They Have Not Been Altered



In Grucci v Grucci, --- N.E.2d ----, 2012 WL 5845008 (N.Y.), 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07856 Plaintiff Michael Grucci and defendant Christine Grucci were married in 1988 and had two children. In 1998, Christine sued Michael for divorce. A few months later, Michael was charged with harassing Christine, and the District Court issued an order of protection directing him to stay away from her. In January 2000, Michael was accused of violating the order. The matter was presented to a grand jury, which returned an indictment charging Michael with two counts of first-degree criminal contempt for placing Christine in fear of death or injury by telephone, and harassing her by repeated telephone calls with no purpose of legitimate communication (Penal Law § 215.51[b][iii], [iv], respectively). After a bench trial in August 2001, County Court acquitted Michael. The court concluded that Christine's testimony was not credible because of "discrepanc[ies]" in the way she described Michael's alleged threat to the police, the grand jury and at trial. In March 2002, Michael brought a civil action against Christine to recover damages for malicious prosecution. At trial Michael sought, through the testimony of his brother, Anthony Grucci, to play for the jury an audiotape of a telephone conversation in which Christine purportedly made clear to Anthony, at some point after she went to the police, that she was not afraid of Michael. Christine's attorney successfully objected, inter alia, to admission of the audiotape. Michael's attorney sought to play the audiotape during Anthony's testimony "as part of [his] presentation of [the telephone] conversation" with Christine that Anthony was recounting. Christine's attorney objected to the audiotape's admission on the grounds it was unreliable, "pieced together from a number of things" and "unintelligible"; that no chain of custody had been established; and generally that "no foundation [had been] laid for it at [that] point."In response, Michael's attorney offered only to have Anthony identify the voices on the tape and state "whether or not the tape recording [was] fair and accurate." When the judge asked if the tape had been authenticated, Michael's attorney responded "Not yet; this witness will authenticate."The judge then sustained the objection, and Michael's attorney stated that he had no further questions for Anthony.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. In an unsigned memorandum, it observed that while a party to a taped conversation can identify the speakers, "identity and authenticity are separate facets of the required foundation, both of which must be established" ( People v. Ely, 68 N.Y.2d 520, 528 [1986] ). The Court of Appeals stated: "The predicate for admission of tape recordings in evidence is clear and convincing proof that the tapes are genuine and that they have not been altered" ( People v Ely, supra, at 522). Here, there was no attempt to offer proof about who recorded the conversation, how it was recorded (e.g., the equipment used) or the chain of custody during the nearly nine years that elapsed between early 2000, when the conversation allegedly took place, and the trial in late 2008. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the judge did not abuse his discretion by requiring more than Anthony's representation that the tape was "fair and accurate" to establish a sufficient "predicate" before playing the tape for the jury.

 

Fourth Department Affirms Holding of Supreme Court that Where Complaint States a Cause of Action for a Divorce on the Ground of Irretrievable Breakdown There is No Right to a Trial.

In Palermo v Palermo, 35 Misc.3d 1211(A)950 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup Ct 2011), an action for a divorce, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It held that the complaint stated a cause of action for a divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, because a sworn statement by one partner that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for a period in excess of six months was set forth on the face of the amended pleadings, and complied with the language of the statute. Supreme Court held that it was not subject to the trial right under DRL § 173. The court also denied the motion to dismiss for violation of the statute of limitations. It held that there is no statute of limitations under DRL § 170(7) because the cause of action only arises at the time the party swears that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for a period in excess of six months. A cause does not accrue until there is “a legal right” to be enforced.. The cause of action for divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown accrues at the time of the attestation by one partner and not sooner. The statute of limitations has no pertinence to a cause of action that arises at the time of the filing of the complaint. In Palermo v Palermo, 953 NYS2d 533 [4th Dept 2012], 2012 WL 5458608 (Mem), 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07528 2012 NY Slip Op 07528 the order of the Supreme Court was unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court. (See Palermo v Palermo, 35 Misc.3d 1211(A), 950 N.Y.S.2d 724 )
 


Second Department Holds That Family Offense Proceeding Did Not Constitute a "Child Custody Proceeding" Within the Meaning of the UCCJEA Where it Did Not Raise an Issue of Legal Custody, Physical Custody, or Visitation with Respect to the Children

In
Matter of Hassan v. Silva,
--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2012 WL 5503641 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) the father appealed from orders of the Family Court as, upon finding that the Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County, Pennsylvania, was the more appropriate forum for the father to seek custody of the subject children, or obtain any other related relief, declined jurisdiction over the matters and dismissed his child custody and family offense petitions upon the ground that New York is an inconvenient forum. The Appellate Division pointed out that a court of this state which has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, may decline to exercise it if it finds that New York is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum (Domestic Relations Law §76-f[1]) The factors to be considered in making this determination include the length of time the child has resided outside the state, the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state or country that would assume jurisdiction, the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence, and the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation (Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[2]). Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adhering to so much of its original determination as declined jurisdiction over the father's custody petitions and dismissed those petitions on the ground that New York is an inconvenient forum. The children, who were now five and three years old, lived in Pennsylvania since August 2010 with the father's permission and, therefore, evidence regarding their care, well-being, and personal relationships was more readily available in Pennsylvania. There was no evidence that the children retained substantial connections with New York or that significant evidence was in this State. The Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County, Pennsylvania, was familiar with the family and the pending issues, having issued a final order of protection against the father in favor of the mother and children and an interim custody order in the mother's custody proceeding. Furthermore, the travel time between the courts was only 2 ½ hours, and the Pennsylvania court is willing to exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Family Court properly determined that the Pennsylvania court was a more appropriate forum to determine the issues of custody and visitation.

However, the father's family offense proceeding did not constitute a "child custody proceeding" within the meaning of the UCCJEA since it did not raise an issue of legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to the children (Domestic Relations Law §75-a[4] ). Accordingly, the Family Court erred in dismissing it pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 76-f. All of the acts complained of in the petition occurred in New York (Family Ct Act § 818).


 

Thứ Sáu, 28 tháng 12, 2012

The Who Are You Kidding Award Goes To Judge Felice O'Shea For Censuring and Not Removing Bronx Surrogate Judge Lee Holtzman

Hands counting money, stock photo. REUTERS Jo Yong hak

 
From Betsy Combier:I attended almost every
hearing date of Bronx Surrogate Court Judge Lee
Holtzman's "trial". What a theatre performance
he gave! I attended partially due to the fact that Manhattan Public
Administrator Ethel Griffin stole the estate of my mom, with the
assistance of former Manhattan Surrogate Judge Renee Roth and
Attorneys Kenneth Wasserman, Eli Uncyk, Peter Schram, and
Jonathan Landsman. Even Eliot Spitzer was involved in not only the
theft of my mom's estate (her Will - which left me her apartment in
NYC - was declared null and void by Renee Roth and then by Nora
Anderson's replacement, Judge Troy Webber) but hundreds of others
from the rightful heirs.
RICO in the New York State Unified Court System: How the Courts
Steal Your Property, Your Children, and Try To Destroy Your Life...
And How You Can Stop Them
Dont forget to listen in the article above to
the taped conversation between me and NYPD detective Ahearne
about how 1st Department Appellate Division Judge Karla Moskowitz
paid Attorney Kenneth Wasserman to harass me.

 

Bronx surrogate fights misconduct 

charge in rare public hearing

9/19/2012)

By Joseph Ax

NEW YORK, Sept 19 (Reuters) - Bronx Surrogate Lee Holzman asked 
a disciplinary panel Wednesday to dismiss charges of misconduct against 
him for failing to fire a lawyer in his court who improperly billed estates 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees before performing any work.
The hearing before the state Commission on Judicial Conduct offered a rare 
glimpse inside what are usually secret proceedings. Holzman waived his 
right to confidentiality last year.
Fewer than a dozen judges have elected to waive secrecy in more than 750 
cases since 1978, according to the commission.
In a crowded hearing room, a lawyer for the commission's counsel and 
Holzman's lawyer painted diametrically opposing portraits of the judge in 
the months after he learned in 2006 that lawyer Michael Lippman had been 
billing legal fees in advance, a violation of the court's protocol.
"The surrogate put in place measures to remedy the problem and protect 
the public," said Holzman's lawyer, David Godosky. He claimed the judge 
was the only one to act to fix the issue, while investigators from the FBI, 
the city's Department of Investigation and the Bronx district attorney's office 
did not charge Lippman with any wrongdoing for years.
But Mark Levine, the lawyer for the commission's counsel, told the commission 
that Holzman had abandoned his duty to the public and urged it to remove him 
from the bench.
"Don't let him fool you," Levine said. "This was a clear abrogation of judicial responsibility."
The commission filed charges against Holzman after Lippman, the counsel to 
the public administrator, was indicted in 2010 for stealing $300,000 in excess 
fees. Lippman has pleaded not guilty.
The public administrator handles estates for which there is no designated heir.
Rather than fire Lippman, Holzman instead demoted him and instituted a 
repayment structure in which Lippman would turn over any new fees he 
earned to repay the money he had improperly collected in previous cases. 
Holzman said Wednesday he was unaware of the extent of Lippman's 
transgressions in 2006.
Last year, a judicial referee, retired state Supreme Court Justice Felice 
O'Shea, conducted a three-week trial to determine whether any of the 
commission's misconduct charges should stand.
In her July report, O'Shea concluded one count of misconduct should be 
sustained for Holzman's failure to terminate Lippman but recommended that 
he be cleared of other charges, including claims that he broke the law by rubber-stamping Lippman's fees without enough documentation and that his lack of 
oversight led to corruption in his court. She also found that Holzman had 
allowed his personal affection for Lippman to color his judgment.
Wednesday's hearing was called to hear arguments from both sides on whether 
the commission should accept all, some or none of O'Shea's findings.
Holzman defended his decision, telling the commission it was an appropriate 
response that would ensure estates were made whole while forcing Lippman 
to complete the work for which he had already been paid. Lippman did not 
earn another penny after 2006, he said.
But Levine said Holzman's motives were far more self-serving. He said 
Holzman had no desire to expose himself to scrutiny and wanted to protect 
Lippman, whom Levine described as a longtime friend of Holzman's.
"He was not my friend," Holzman said in response. "There was absolutely no 
attempt to cover it up."
Holzman is retiring at the end of the year after having reached the state's 
mandatory retirement age, but Levine said his actions still warranted removal 
and would serve notice to other judges that such conduct will not be tolerated.
The commission, which met after the hearing in private to discuss the matter, 
will issue a written decision, likely later this fall. If the commission disciplines 
Holzman, he will have 30 days to appeal its decision to the court of appeals.
The case is the Matter of the Honorable Lee Holzman.
For the commission: Mark Levine.
For Holzman: David Godosky of Godosky & Gentile.
Follow us on Twitter @ReutersLegal | Like us on Facebook




Thứ Năm, 27 tháng 12, 2012

4th Circuit Court Denies ACCG's Request for Rehearing

"The court denies the petition for rehearing en banc."  That was the order of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 18 in the case of Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Department of State; Assistant Secretary of State, Educational and Cultural Affairs.

The ACCG set up a test case in 2009 to challenge import restrictions covering ancient Chinese and Cypriot coins.  The import controls were enacted pursuant to the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA).  The Guild failed to win its case in federal district court in 2011 and appealed.  The federal appeals court thereafter struck down the ACCG's challenge in October.  The ACCG, in response, filed a petition in November for a rehearing on the matter.  The appellate court denied the request, and on Tuesday issued a mandate to effect its October 22 ruling.


This post is researched, written, and published on the blog Cultural Heritage Lawyer Rick St. Hilaire at culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com. Text copyrighted 2012 by Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PLLC. Any unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of this post is prohibited. CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Guilty Plea in Dinosaur Smuggling Case

Eric Prokopi pleaded guilty on Thursday in a case involving the smuggling of dinosaur fossils.  In a press release, Preet Bharara, the U.S. States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced:

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara
PROKOPI, 38, pled guilty today to an Information charging him with one count of conspiracy with respect to the Chinese flying dinosaur, one count of entry of goods by means of false statements with respect to the Mongolian dinosaurs, and one count of interstate and foreign transportation of goods converted and taken by fraud. ... In addition, PROKOPI has agreed to forfeit the proceeds of his offense, including but not limited to, the First Bataar, the Second Bataar, any and all interest in the Tyrannosaurus skeleton believed to be in Great Britain, the Saurolophus and Oviraptor skeletons that had been in PROKOPI’S custody, and any and all other fossil parts of Mongolian origin that PROKOPI brought into the country between 2010 and 2012."

Federal authorities arrested Prokopi after the government's initial forfeiture case intensified in October.  Readers will recall that federal prosecutors first filed a forfeiture complaint in June seeking the return of Tyrannosaurus Bataar bones that were auctioned for sale.  Yesterday's resolution in the criminal case also resolves the civil forfeiture case.


This post is researched, written, and published on the blog Cultural Heritage Lawyer Rick St. Hilaire at culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com. Text copyrighted 2012 by Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PLLC. Any unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of this post is prohibited. CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Thứ Ba, 25 tháng 12, 2012

U.S. v. Perez: Criminal Penalties for Violating Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act


As 2012 comes to a close, a case concluded in the Central District of California this year is important to highlight.  It is the federal district court matter of United States v. Perez(07-CR-499 C.D.Ca. 2007), prosecuted by U.S. Attorney André Birotte, Jr.'s office.

Source: U.S. Attorney's Office, C.D.CA
The case confirms that the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. 545, can punish cultural property smugglers who illegally import archaeological or ethnological material in violation of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA).

It has been suggested over the years that a person who violates the CPIA’s cultural property import restrictions faces the civil remedy of seizure of the cultural object but not criminal prosecution.  So if a person smuggles an archaeological object into the United States from Cyprus, for example—a country that has a bilateral agreement with the U.S. under the CPIA—the smuggler cannot be indicted or go to prison, according to this argument.  Only the smuggled artifact can be taken away.  I believe that this interpretation of law is incorrect.

In a paper presented to the International Council of Museums Conservation Committee in 2007 and referenced by Patty Gerstenblith, “Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past,” 8Chicago Journal of International Law169 (2007), I stated that the CPIA’s “civil remedy of forfeiting an unlawfully imported object is arguably complemented by the smuggling statute’s criminal remedy of prosecuting the perpetrator. That is because the federal anti-smuggling law declares that a person is subject to criminal prosecution when he fraudulently or knowingly imports an item ‘contrary to law.’”  This argument, that an individual can face conviction for smuggling as a result of violating the CPIA's import restrictions is supported by the conviction in the Perez case.

In that case, federal officials discovered that Robert Perez was selling pre-Columbian and pre-Hispanic pots imported illegally into the United States from El Salvador.  The U.S. has import restrictions on cultural property from El Salvador as a result of a bilateral agreement with that nation, authorized by the CPIA.  The grand jury indicted Perez on one count of smuggling under 18 U.S.C. 545, charging the following:

“On or about December 11, 2002, in Orange County, within the Central District of California, defendant ROBERT PEREZ didfraudulently and knowingly sell merchandise, namely, one melon-shaped, pre-Hispanic ceramic bowl, after the merchandise's importation into the United States, knowing said merchandise had been imported into the United States contrary to law.Specifically, on said date, defendant PEREZ knowingly sold said ceramic bowl knowing that it was a pre-Hispanic archeological material that had been imported into the United States from El Salvador contrary to law, namely, without first obtaining a valid export certificate from the country of El Salvador, in violation of [the CPIA] Title 19, United States Code, Section 2606(a).”

The case concluded with a plea agreement in January 2012, supporting the opinion that the CPIA's import restrictions on cultural property may be enforced by federal criminal statutes.


This post is researched, written, and published on the blog Cultural Heritage Lawyer Rick St. Hilaire at culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com. Text copyrighted 2012 by Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PLLC. Any unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of this post is prohibited. CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Thứ Sáu, 21 tháng 12, 2012

U.S. v. Khouli et al. Update: Second Guilty Plea Expected Today in Egyptian Antiquities Case


Earlier this week, Holyland Numismatics coin dealer Salem Alshdaifat signaled his intention to plead guilty to one charge of accessory after the fact in the case of U.S. v. Khouli et al.  The reduced offense is a class B misdemeanor under 18 USC 1018, subject to a maximum punishment of six months incarceration and a fine of $5000.

A federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of New York originally indicted Alshdaifat in May 2011 with conspiracy to smuggle.  The indictment alleged that he directed Mousa Khouli to wire $20,000 to Ayman Ramadan’s bank account.  It also alleged that Alshdaifat received an airway bill from Ramadan incorrectly showing that “wooden panels” were shipped by Ramadan’s company in the United Arab Emirates to JFK airport in New York.  Alshdaifat was also charged with money laundering conspiracy, smuggling goods into the United States, and fraudulent importation and transportation of goods.  The indictment described the goods as an Egyptian inner coffin, Egyptian funerary boats and limestone figures, and a portion of an outer lid of a nesting Egyptian coffin set.  

A grand jury indictment is simply a mechanism that initiates a criminal case; it is not a finding of guilt.

In a December 19 letter sent to the federal district court in Brooklyn, which describes today's expected plea of guilty to the substituted misdemeanor charge, Alshdaifat's attorney writes:

"The specific conduct to which Mr. Alshdaifat is charged in the misdemeanor information, and is expected to allocute to in court on Friday [December 21, 2012], involves the importing, on or about May 7, 2009, of certain Egyptian artifacts, including limestone funerary objects, from the United Arab Emirates to the United States by other co-defendants in the case. The airwaybill for this shipment was required by United States Customs law and regulations to include "such information as is necessary to enable the Customs Service to determine whether the merchandise may be released from customs custody." 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(l)(A)(i). This information includes, inter alia, the value of the goods being imported. 19 U.S.C. § 1485(a). In this case, the importer of  record, Mousa Khouli, intentionally misled Customs by placing merchandise in international mail that exceeded the value authorized to be entered into the United States by informal entry through the post. 19 C.F.R. Part 145, subp. B, § 145.12(a)(2).  On the airwaybill, he intentionally omitted the value and country of origin of the merchandise included in the mail package.  This certification made to the United States Customs Service was knowingly false in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1018 and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484-85. 

"After the international mail shipment arrived in the United States and was received by Mr. Khouli, he asked Mr. Alshdaifat, the seller on consignment of this merchandise, not to require him to make a direct payment of $40,000 for these items.  Instead, the two agreed to credit their accounts on other business.  By doing this, Mr. Khouli was able to avoid creating evidence that he knew that the value of the objects he imported was more than $2,000 and that he made intentionally false statements to Customs.  After the importation had been completed, Mr. Alshdaifat agreed to this financial arrangement knowing that it was intended to avoid creating evidence of Mr. Khouli's earlier violation of the U.S. Customs laws."

Last month the federal district court sentenced Khouli to house arrest after he pleaded guilty on April 18 to smuggling Egyptian cultural property into the United States and making a false statement to law enforcement.  Prosecutors were unable to obtain the prison term they requested.

Alshdaifat too seeks the court's leniency.  His lawyer writes, "The offense to which Mr. Alshdaifat is pleading guilty is substantially less serious and his conduct much less culpable than that of Mr. Khouli."  Counsel for the defendant adds:

ICE: Artifacts seized in US v. Khouli et al.
"Because Mr. Alshdaifat had only an accessory-after-the-fact role in Mr. Khouli's scheme to make false statements to U.S. Customs, and because he otherwise has a commendable personal history, no prior criminal history, and sympathetic family circumstances, he respectfully requests that the Court not impose a term of imprisonment or probation as part of his sentence for this conduct.  Also, because Mr. Alshdaifat already has suffered substantial economic harm from the fact that this case was brought against him, in both the form of lost business and from the government's improper seizure of his entire inventory of ancient coins for several months after raiding his home at the time of his arrest, we respectfully ask the Court not to impose a significant fine."

Antiquities collector and businessman Joseph A. Lewis, II was also indicted as a co-defendant last year.  His next court hearing is scheduled for January 3, 2013.  The fourth co-defendant indicted, Ayman Ramadan, remains a fugitive.  Both are presumed innocent unless the prosecution proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

In 2011, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reportedly seized a large quantity of artifacts associated with the criminal investigation, including hundreds of allegedly smuggled antiquities from throughout the world, an Egyptian sarcophagus, two Indian wooden horses, and thousands of antique coins from ancient Greece, Rome, Egypt and Ancient Mesopotamian.  Authorities last year returned coins seized from Alshdaifat's home back to him. In 2011, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reportedly seized a large quantity of artifacts associated with the criminal investigation, including hundreds of allegedly smuggled antiquities from throughout the world, an Egyptian sarcophagus, two Indian wooden horses, and thousands of antique coins from ancient Greece, Rome, Egypt and Ancient Mesopotamian.  Authorities last year returned coins seized from Alshdaifat's home back to him.

UPDATE December 31, 2012

Court papers published on Friday reveal that Alshdaifat pled guilty on December 21 pursuant to an agreement with federal prosecutors.  He pleaded to accessory after the fact to making a false official writing, a misdemeanor.  The information filed by U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch charged the defendant with the following:

"In or about and between October 2008 and November 2009, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant SALEM ALSHDAIFAT, together with others, knowing that an offense against the United States had been committed, to wit: making and delivering as true a certificate or other writing containing a false statement, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1018, did knowingly and intentionally receive, relieve, comfort and assist the offender, to wit: Mousa Khouli, also known as "Morris Khouli," in order to hinder and prevent his apprehension, trial and punishment. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3 and 3551 et seq.)"

The court imposed a penalty of $1000 plus $10 special assessment.
 

This post is researched, written, and published on the blog Cultural Heritage Lawyer Rick St. Hilaire at culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com. Text copyrighted 2012 by Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PLLC. Any unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of this post is prohibited. CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Thứ Năm, 20 tháng 12, 2012

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution Urging Countries to Take Antiquities Trafficking Seriously

U.S. Mission to the U.N.  Source: Elmschrat CC
The United States has supported a Greek-sponsored UN resolution (A/RES/67/80) titled "Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin."  The resolution (A/67/L.34), adopted by a consensus the General Assembly on December 12, urges nations to take antiquities trafficking seriously.  It was co-sponsored by 98 member states, including Canada, China, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and the United States.

A United Nations press statement remarked,"By the text, the Assembly deplored damage to world cultural heritage sites, particularly in recent conflict and crisis situations, and called for an immediate end to such acts, reminding States Parties to the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of their obligations."

In his address to the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Anastassis Mitsialis of Greece said, "Despite concerted international efforts to tackle the problem, illicit traffic of cultural property continues to pose a serious threat to cultural heritage of States. This threat is higher in situations of crisis and conflict, when cultural objects are often smuggled outside their countries of origin."  Ambassador Mitsialis added that "interaction with the international art market in view of improving practices in various areas of expertise such as provenance, investigation, ethics and procedures of restitution proves to be of paramount importance."  Representatives from Argentina, Cyprus, Italy, and Turkey also spoke on the assembly floor in support of the resolution.

The resolution, in part, "Urges Member States to introduce effective national and international  measures to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in cultural property, including  publicizing legislation and offering special training for police, Customs and border services and to consider such trafficking a serious crime, as defined in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime."  UNTOC, ratified by the U.S. in 2005, defines serious crime as "conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty."

The UN resolution "Also recognizes the importance of cooperation among States in the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural property, as well as its illegal removal from the countries of origin, through, inter alia, the conclusion of bilateral agreements and  mutual legal assistance, including the prosecution of persons involved in such activities and extradition, in accordance with the laws of cooperating States and under applicable international law."

A video covering the introduction, discussion, and adoption of the resolution appears below (total time: 30 minutes).  The discussion references an August 1, 2012 report of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin, which can be viewed here.




This post is researched, written, and published on the blog Cultural Heritage Lawyer Rick St. Hilaire at culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.com. Text copyrighted 2012 by Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PLLC. Any unauthorized reproduction or retransmission of this post is prohibited. CONTACT: www.culturalheritagelawyer.com

Bài đăng phổ biến